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KILLING ONE’S ABUSER: PREMEDITATION, PATHOLOGY, 
OR PROVOCATION? 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Grove frequently abused his wife, Jessie, throughout their twenty-two 
year marriage.1  One night in 1981, he arrived home drunk, threatening to kill 
Jessie and the children.2  After Grove finally went to sleep, Jessie shot him.3  
Because Jessie admitted that Grove was asleep when she shot him, a 
Pennsylvania court found as a matter of law that he could not have posed an 
“imminent” threat to her or her children and therefore denied her a self-defense 
jury instruction.4  The jury ultimately found her guilty of first-degree murder.5 
Mr. Diaz physically and sexually abused his wife, Madelyn, for five years, 
often threatening to kill her.6  One night, Madelyn shot him as he slept, fearing 
that he would carry out his threats when he awoke.7  Like Jessie, she was 
charged with murder, but a New York court allowed Madelyn to receive a self-
defense jury instruction, and she was acquitted.8 
The stories of these two women provide just a glimpse into the inconsistent 
results reached in cases involving battered women who kill their abusers in 
nonconfrontational situations.  Most homicides committed by women against 
abusive partners occur during an actual physical confrontation,9 and these 
 
 1 See Commonwealth v. Grove, 526 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). 
 2 Id. at 371, 375. 
 3 Id. at 371. 
 4 Id. at 375. 
 5 Id. at 371. 
 6 See Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Representation of 
Battered Women Who Kill, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 227, 236 (1986) (discussing People v. Diaz, No. 2714 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983)). 
 7 See JULIE BLACKMAN, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 185 (1989) (discussing Diaz). 
 8 Id. at 185–86. 
 9 Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform 
Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 397 (1991) (finding that approximately 75% of battered women who kill 
their abusers do so under confrontational circumstances).  Even in cases involving an actual confrontation, 
however, seemingly justifiable self-defense claims have been rejected.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watson, 
431 A.2d 949 (Pa. 1981) (discussing the trial court’s rejection of a self-defense claim on imminence grounds 
where the battered woman defendant killed her common law husband while “he [had] her around the neck”). 
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cases can proceed under normal self-defense rules.10  However, in a minority 
of situations, battered women kill their sleeping abusers11 and sometimes 
declare that their actions were necessary to prevent future serious bodily harm 
or even death.12  While some American jurisdictions allow a jury to consider 
self-defense when a battered woman has committed a nonconfrontational 
homicide, many do not because any threat from a sleeping abuser is regarded 
as non-imminent.13  This disparity in self-defense law results in varying 
outcomes for battered women defendants in homicide trials.14 
For self-defense to justify a killing, the defendant must have genuinely and 
reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to protect 
herself from an unavoidable, imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm.15  
Evidence on Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS), a theory describing the 
effects of recurring abuse in domestic relationships, attempts to explain why 
conventional assumptions about reasonableness and imminence fail to account 
for the real-life circumstances of the battered woman defendant.16  Some courts 
have used BWS to replace an objective standard of reasonableness with a 
primarily subjective standard, allowing battered women to more easily and, 
oftentimes, successfully argue self-defense even though no immediate threat 
would have been found under traditional legal theories.17 
 
 10 See Maguigan, supra note 9, at 392; see also ROBBIN S. OGLE & SUSAN JACOBS, SELF-DEFENSE AND 
BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 120 (2002). 
 11 The term “sleeping abusers” will be used throughout this Comment to describe all abusers who are 
passive at the time of a nonconfrontational killing. 
 12 See CHARLES PATRICK EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 46 (1987) (noting that a majority of 
women who kill their abusers claim to have acted in self-defense); OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 10, at 121–22 
(discussing how a battered woman’s heightened sensitivity to danger from her abuser may lead her to 
reasonably apprehend future danger). 
 13 See Joshua Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
457, 461 (2006) (noting that a strong majority of jurisdictions do not allow a self-defense instruction where 
women kill in nonconfrontational circumstances). 
 14 Compare State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1989) (finding a battered woman who killed her 
sleeping husband guilty of manslaughter, though her sentence was later commuted), and Commonwealth v. 
Grove, 526 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (finding a battered woman who killed her sleeping husband 
guilty of first-degree murder), with Julie Johnson, Queens Woman Acquitted in Killing of Husband, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1987, at A1 (discussing the acquittal of a battered woman who killed her husband). 
 15 See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of 
Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 28–29 (1986) (listing the elements required for self-
defense). 
 16 V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1283 (2001).  Of course, women 
do not exclusively make up the class of battered defendants.  However, this Comment only focuses on battered 
women who kill in nonconfrontational circumstances. 
 17 See, e.g., State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 817–18 (N.D. 1983) (approving a highly subjective self-
defense standard). 
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However, the traditional reasonableness and imminence requirements are 
crucial components of self-defense law precisely because they help ensure that 
only unavoidable killings are justified.18  One can hardly argue that a sleeping 
abuser presents a truly unavoidable threat.  Hence, courts that stretch the 
traditional self-defense requirements to accommodate battered women distort 
the traditional elements of the law and may encourage violent self-help.19  On 
the other hand, jurisdictions that refuse to allow battered women who 
preemptively kill to claim self-defense, thus resulting in murder or 
manslaughter convictions, may be out of step with notions of substantive 
justice.20  The record number of pardons and commutations in recent years for 
battered women convicted of murder reveals that this is most likely the case.21  
Therefore neither approach is satisfying. 
This Comment illustrates how the current American approach of limiting 
battered women who preemptively kill to claims of self-defense has resulted in 
distortions in the law.  It explores some of the practical results of using self-
defense for battered defendants in nonconfrontational cases and demonstrates 
that this approach leads to outcomes that are in tension with social sentiments 
and the goals of the criminal law.  Therefore, a new strategy is needed to better 
accommodate such cases.  In proposing a new solution, this Comment draws 
from the experiences and strategies of approaches used in Australia and 
England to address the issues posed by battered defendants. 
Advocating the English approach, this Comment argues that using the law 
of provocation,22 rather than self-defense, will lead to the most just outcomes 
 
 18 See Dressler, supra note 13, at 463, 467 (arguing that justification depends on the reasonableness of 
the act while necessity depends on the imminence of the threat). 
 19 For examples of cases in which courts allowed battered women who killed in nonconfrontational cases 
to rely on self-defense, see Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 819–20; State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1345–46 
(Ohio 1997); and Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 6 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). 
 20 For examples of cases in which courts barred a battered woman from successfully claiming self-
defense, see State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 578–79 (Kan. 1988); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 
1989). 
 21 See Linda L. Ammons, Why Do You Do the Things You Do? Clemency for Battered Incarcerated 
Women, A Decade’s Review, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 533, 544, 552 (2003) (discussing the 
clemency granted to twenty-eight battered women in Ohio incarcerated for killing their abusive partners and 
commuted sentences granted to eight Maryland battered women defendants); Elizabeth Leland, Abused Wife’s 
Sentence Commuted; Woman Killed Husband in 1985, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 8, 1989, at 1B (discussing 
the sentence commutation of Judy Norman, a battered woman who killed her abusive husband and was 
convicted of manslaughter after her self-defense claim was not allowed to go to the jury). 
 22 A provocation defense can reduce a murder charge to manslaughter if the actor killed in a sudden 
“state of passion” in response to some provoking act that would incite a reasonable actor in the defendant’s 
circumstances to react similarly.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 775 (4th ed. 2003). 
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for battered women who preemptively kill their abusers.  However, current 
provocation laws do not accurately reflect the situational realities in which 
battered women kill their abusers.  Hence, provocation laws will need to be 
reformed to allow for situations in which women kill out of fear of serious 
violence. 
Part I of this Comment briefly discusses BWS, its development in the 
United States, and its relationship to the law of self-defense.  Part II more 
closely examines the current problems with the treatment of BWS in American 
courts and the extreme results reached for battered women who kill in 
nonconfrontational circumstances.  Part III explores the legal treatment of 
BWS by courts in Australia and England in order to consider other strategies 
used to accommodate battered women within the law.  This Part recognizes 
that comparing the solutions reached by other common law countries offers an 
opportunity to find a better solution for the United States.  Finally, Part IV 
proposes applying provocation law to battered women who preemptively kill 
their abusers as the best way to achieve substantive justice for battered women 
while still fulfilling the goals of the criminal law.  However, Part IV also 
recommends changing current provocation law to more accurately reflect the 
realities and perceptions of battered women who kill their sleeping abusers.  It 
proposes a reformed provocation defense that would mitigate murder to 
manslaughter in cases where battered women preemptively kill an abuser 
out of a fear of serious violence. 
I. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AND SELF-DEFENSE 
Battered women defendants who kill their abusers often claim they acted in 
self-defense.23  Generally, however, battered women who preemptively kill 
their abusers cannot prove the traditional elements of self-defense, which 
include reasonableness and imminence.24  As a result, the theory of BWS was 
developed to support a battered woman’s self-defense claim by showing how 
the woman might have reasonably thought her actions were defensive and 
necessary.25  This Part first describes the traditional elements of self-defense 
 
 23 EWING, supra note 12, at 46 (discussing battered women’s self-defense claims). 
 24 See id. at 46–48 (exploring the difficulties faced by battered women defendants in raising a successful 
self-defense claim). 
 25 See Rebecca Bradfield, Understanding the Battered Woman Who Kills Her Violent Partner—The 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence of Domestic Violence in Australia, 9 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 177, 180 
(2002) (“At its inception, BWS evidence was a device directed towards counteracting the limitations of the 
substantive law of self-defence as it applied to battered women.”). 
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law and examines the primary difficulties battered women defendants face in 
claiming self-defense.  Next, this Part explains the theory behind BWS and 
how evidence of past abuse may be used to inform a self-defense claim.  
Finally, this Part briefly discusses the introduction of BWS into American 
courts. 
A. The Self-Defense Defense 
Self-defense is generally defined as the justifiable use of force upon 
another when one reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect 
oneself from imminent danger of unlawful bodily harm.26  The force used must 
not be excessive in relation to the harm threatened.27  Thus, a person is 
justified in using deadly force only if there is a reasonable belief that such 
force is necessary to protect herself from imminent, unlawful deadly force by 
another.28 
In homicide cases, the traditional requirements of self-defense are 
interpreted narrowly because the defense is being used to justify the taking of a 
human life.29  A person who defends herself against a threat of harm can only 
use violent self-help as a last resort.30  By requiring that the defender’s actions 
be in response to an immediately threatened harm, self-defense law aims to 
ensure that only those defendants who have no other choice but to kill are 
acquitted.31 
1. The Elements of Self-Defense 
To make a successful self-defense claim, a defendant must show that she 
had a reasonable belief that she was in imminent danger of great bodily harm 
or death at the time she acted.32  Most courts have found that a self-defense 
claim has both subjective and objective elements.33  First, the defendant must 
have subjectively believed she was in danger of death or serious harm at the 
time she acted and thus needed to use deadly force to repel an imminent, 
 
 26 LAFAVE, supra note 22, at 539. 
 27 This is known as the proportionality rule.  Rosen, supra note 15, at 30. 
 28 LAFAVE, supra note 22, at 456. 
 29 Rosen, supra note 15, at 27. 
 30 Id. at 31. 
 31 Id. at 53. 
 32 SANA LOUE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: SOCIETAL, MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES 
108 (2001). 
 33 See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988) (discussing the application of a two-pronged 
self-defense standard). 
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unlawful attack.34  Second, her subjective belief must have been one that a 
“reasonable person” in the same situation would have possessed.35  Therefore, 
self-defense justifies a defendant in killing a perceived aggressor only if the 
belief was also objectively reasonable.36 
Reasonableness and imminence are closely related.  In the absence of an 
imminent threat, the objective reasonableness element of self-defense usually 
cannot be met since there was no immediate harm requiring a reaction.37  
Though there is no single definition of “imminence” applied by courts, at 
common law it is generally understood to mean a threat of harm that is 
pressing and urgent and will occur immediately.38  The danger is not imminent 
if the harm is threatened to occur at a later time.39  The imminence requirement 
ensures that a person will use deadly force to preserve herself from death or 
serious harm only as a last resort.40 
2. Problems for Battered Women Who Claim Self-Defense 
Battered women who kill sleeping abusers face many obstacles in raising a 
traditional self-defense claim.41  The objective reasonableness element of self-
defense is the most problematic.42  This requirement was originally developed 
to address situations where a man kills another man in a one-time, face-to-face 
 
 34 OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 10, at 98–99. 
 35 Id.  Self-defense is available if the defendant acted reasonably, even if the defendant was mistaken in 
her belief of an actual imminent threat.  See Rosen, supra note 15, at 31.  Self-defense is not available, 
however, to someone whose belief was unreasonable but sincere.  OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 10 at 98–99.  In 
such cases, the traditional rule is that the actor is guilty of murder, although a minority of jurisdictions allows 
an unreasonably mistaken defendant to assert an “imperfect self-defense” claim, which mitigates a murder 
offense to manslaughter.  See id. at 117–20. 
 36 OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 10 at 98–99.  Today, even in the majority of jurisdictions, the “objective” 
standard of reasonableness in self-defense is not purely objective, but rather incorporates some subjective 
elements.  Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered Women’s Self-
Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 165 (2004).  Commentators have argued that a true objective 
standard would be unduly harsh and would hold the defendant to a standard she could not meet.  See, e.g., id. 
 37 OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 10, at 128. 
 38 See Nourse, supra note 16, at 1242 (discussing some meanings of imminence); see also JOSHUA 
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 232 (5th ed. 2009) (comparing imminence with immediacy). 
 39 Rosen, supra note 15, at 30–31; see also State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13 (N.C. 1989) (defining 
“imminence” as “‘immediate danger, such as must be instantly met, such as cannot be guarded against by 
calling for the assistance of others or the protection of the law’” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 676 (5th 
ed. 1979))). 
 40 Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 13. 
 41 EWING, supra note 12, at 47. 
 42 Id. 
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confrontation.43  Of course, this stereotypical scenario does not accurately 
reflect the realities of a battered woman’s situation.44  Generally, a battered 
woman must protect herself against a male abuser who is physically larger and 
stronger and with whom she has an ongoing or past relationship.45  
Nevertheless, under traditional self-defense law, a battered woman defendant 
who kills in a nonconfrontational situation could not have acted as a 
“reasonable person” since there was no obvious, immediate threat.46  
Accordingly, a majority of courts have found, as a matter of law, that a 
battered woman’s use of deadly force against her sleeping abuser can never be 
objectively reasonable.47 
Self-defense law also requires that a defendant kill only in response to a 
threatened harm that is immediately going to occur.  Otherwise, the self-
defense claim is negated, and a jury is not given a self-defense instruction.48  
Battered women defendants who kill their abusers preemptively, rather than in 
response to an ongoing, physical attack, do not appear to meet this requirement 
because of the lack of imminent danger posed by a sleeping abuser.49  Thus, 
when self-defense law is strictly applied, a jury will not be allowed to consider 
a self-defense claim in nonconfrontational cases.50 
B. The Battered Woman Syndrome 
Battered Woman Syndrome51 describes the psychological effects and 
behavioral reactions exhibited by victims of ongoing domestic abuse.52  Since 
Lenore Walker introduced the theory in 1979,53 battered defendants have relied 
 
 43 Rosen, supra note 15, at 34. 
 44 See id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See EWING, supra note 12, at 47–48 (noting that the abuser does not seem to pose any harm to the 
battered woman while he is asleep). 
 47 See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988) (stating that self-defense can never be found 
when a battered woman kills her sleeping abuser); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13 (N.C. 1989) (holding that 
a sleeping abuser cannot reasonably pose an imminent threat). 
 48 Dressler, supra note 13, at 461. 
 49 See EWING, supra note 12, at 46–50 (discussing the doctrinal issues posed by “sleeping spouse” cases). 
 50 Dressler, supra note 13, at 461. 
 51 The terms “Battered Wife Syndrome,” “Battered Spouse Syndrome,” or “Battered Person Syndrome” 
also are commonly used. 
 52 See generally LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (3d ed. 2009) 
(investigating the sociological and psychological factors involved in BWS). 
 53 See generally LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1st ed. 1979) (advancing the concepts of 
“learned helplessness” and the “cycle theory of violence”). 
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on BWS evidence to explain why their beliefs and actions could be considered 
reasonable in the context of a self-defense claim.54 
The syndrome draws on the theory of the cycle of violence in battering 
relationships, explaining that the battering is neither random nor constant, but 
rather it occurs in repetitive cyclical phases.55  This cycle leads the battered 
woman to develop a sense of helplessness in which she feels powerless to 
change the situation because she can neither control nor predict the next 
outbreak of violence.56  Walker hypothesized that such “learned 
helplessness”57 would prevent a battered woman from perceiving or acting on 
opportunities to escape the violent relationship.58 
Psychologically, BWS may apply when a woman has been abused at least 
twice and exhibits a cluster of symptoms such as low self-esteem, self-blame, 
anxiety, depression, and despair.59  The syndrome explains that a battered 
woman stays in an abusive relationship as a result of these feelings of 
helplessness and fear.60  Since a woman suffering from BWS feels she cannot 
leave the relationship, she may come to believe that using deadly force is her 
only option for escape.61 
C. BWS in American Courts 
Evidence of BWS serves two functions in the context of a claim of self-
defense.  First, BWS evidence helps a jury credit the testimony of the battered 
woman defendant62 and understand why the woman did not simply leave the 
 
 54 See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 631–35 (D.C. 1979) (allowing the defendant to 
introduce evidence of BWS in support of a self-defense claim). 
 55 There is a tension-building phase, an acute battering phase, and a “honeymoon” phase.  WALKER, 
supra note 52, at 91–94.  This third phase provides positive reinforcement for the battered woman to stay in the 
relationship and reaffirms the woman’s hopes that her abuser’s behavior will change.  Id. at 94. 
 56 Joshua Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormentors: Reflections on Maintaining 
Respect for Human Life While Killing Moral Monsters, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY 259, 263 (Stephen Shute & 
A.P. Simester eds., 2002). 
 57 WALKER, supra note 52, at 71. 
 58 Id. at 71–72. 
 59 See generally WALKER, supra note 52. 
 60 Kinports, supra note 36, at 168. 
 61 See SOLOMON M. FULERO & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 158–59 (3d ed. 
2009) (discussing why a battered woman stays in an abusive relationship and why she might attack her batterer 
while he is asleep). 
 62 At least two-thirds of states consider expert testimony on BWS as relevant to the question of why a 
battered woman did not leave the relationship, and one-fourth of states have specifically found such evidence 
“admissible to bolster the defendant’s credibility.”  Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on 
Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Cases, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 75, 122–25 (1996). 
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relationship.63  Second, BWS testimony may support the objective 
reasonableness requirement by showing that a reasonable person in her 
circumstances would have acted in the same way.64  Without expert testimony 
on BWS to explain a battered woman’s perceptions, a jury likely will not 
understand how the defendant’s reaction could be considered reasonable.65 
For many years, expert testimony on battering and its effects on women 
was generally inadmissible.66  This presented a major obstacle for battered 
women who preemptively killed an abusive partner and claimed self-defense.67  
In 1977, however, the Supreme Court of Washington decided State v. Wanrow, 
a case involving a disabled—not battered—woman who used a weapon to 
defend herself against a threat made by her male neighbor.68  In Wanrow, the 
court held that a woman defendant in a self-defense case “was entitled to have 
the jury consider her actions in the light of her own perceptions of the  
situation . . . .”69  This opinion was the first step toward redefining the 
“reasonable person” in the objective reasonableness test. 
Ibn-Tamas v. United States was the first decision to permit expert 
testimony on BWS.70  The court in Ibn-Tamas reasoned that the admission of 
the evidence was relevant to establish the defendant’s credibility and to help 
the jury understand the defendant’s rationalization of her actions.71  Since Ibn-
Tamas, many courts have found that evidence and expert testimony on BWS 
are necessary to help a jury credit the battered woman defendant’s testimony 
regarding what happened prior to the killing.  In State v. Kelly, for example, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court found that expert testimony on BWS was 
 
 63 Dressler, supra note 56, at 263–64.  More than half the states have found that expert testimony is 
relevant to assessing the reasonableness of the battered woman’s conduct and her belief that she was in danger 
of imminent harm.  Parrish, supra note 62, at 120–21. 
 64 Dressler, supra note 56, at 264. 
 65 See FULERO & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 61, at 158 (illustrating the various purposes served by expert 
testimony on BWS). 
 66 See id. at 157 (noting that expert testimony on battering was admitted for the first time in Ibn-Tamas v. 
United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979)). 
 67 See Developments in the Law—Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 
1577–78 (1993) (“Before the introduction of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in the mid-
1970s, women who killed their abusers in situations in which a narrow interpretation of the law prevented 
them from claiming self-defense often pled guilty . . . .”). 
 68 559 P.2d 548, 551 (Wash. 1977), superseded by statute on other grounds, WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9.73.090 (2009), as recognized in Lewis v. Dep’t of Licensing, 139 P.3d 1078 (Wash. 2006). 
 69 Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 559. 
 70 Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 639; see FULERO & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 61, at 157. 
 71 Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 632–35. 
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essential to rebut general misconceptions regarding battered women.72  The 
court in Kelly further acknowledged the importance of such testimony in 
explaining the defendant’s subjective honesty as well as the objective 
reasonableness of her response.73 
Notwithstanding the increasing use of BWS evidence by battered women 
defendants since the theory was first introduced into American courts, it has 
been subject to much censure.  Critics have disparaged the theory for several 
key reasons: the theory (1) implies that battered women act as a result of a 
mental disorder rather than reasonableness; (2) suggests a stereotypical model 
for all women in battering relationships that does not, in fact, fit many women; 
and (3) uses a learned helplessness model that is inconsistent with the battered 
woman’s use of self-defense.74  Though BWS was designed to help jurors 
understand how a battered woman who killed her abuser might have acted 
reasonably, some commentators claim that BWS evidence has the overall 
effect of emphasizing the stereotype of the unreasonable, “pathological” 
woman.75  As a result, it is questionable whether BWS is still helpful or 
appropriate.76 
II. CURRENT AMERICAN TREATMENT OF BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 
SLEEPING ABUSERS 
Despite the concerns regarding BWS, every state currently admits evidence 
and expert testimony on BWS, although to varying degrees.77  In traditional, 
confrontational self-defense cases, nearly all courts accept BWS evidence and 
give an instruction on self-defense to the jury.78  However, in cases involving 
 
 72 State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984); see also FULERO & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 61, at 
149, box 7.1 (describing some common myths about the battered woman). 
 73 See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 378; see also ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST 
LAWMAKING 130 (2000) (discussing the implications of Kelly). 
 74 Kinports, supra note 36, at 169; see, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 52, 
81 (1994) (describing BWS as a “mental disorder” and noting that “the learned helplessness diagnosis . . . is 
inconsistent with the homicidal act” of killing a batterer); Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, 
Social Science Evidence, and Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 48 (1998) (finding that BWS 
“homogenize[s] women’s experiences”). 
 75 For more discussion on how BWS pathologizes women, see infra Part II.C. 
 76 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Overview and Highlights of the Report, in THE 
VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT 
RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, at v, vii (1996), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/batter.pdf (finding that the term “BWS” is “no longer useful or appropriate”). 
 77 Parrish, supra note 62, at 91. 
 78 Id. at 104–05. 
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nonconfrontational self-defense situations, courts are divided.  This Part 
examines and compares how courts in majority and minority jurisdictions 
currently treat battered women defendants.  Next, this Part discusses the 
practical effects of accommodating battered women within self-defense law 
and argues that the results of current practices reveal inherent flaws with the 
present approaches. 
A. The Self-Defense Problem in Majority Jurisdictions 
In a majority of jurisdictions, a battered woman who kills her sleeping 
abuser is not entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense.79  The rationale used 
by these jurisdictions is that because the woman did not kill to repel an 
ongoing unlawful attack or an imminent assault, she cannot fulfill the objective 
reasonableness requirement of self-defense.80  Courts employing traditional, 
objective notions of self-defense generally decide as a matter of law that the 
“fatal blow” could not have been struck in self-defense.81  Therefore, in most 
jurisdictions, as a matter of law the battered woman’s actions are not classified 
as self-defense but as a culpable homicide like premeditated murder.82 
The Kansas Supreme Court decision of State v. Stewart illustrates how 
courts in majority jurisdictions treat battered women who kill in 
nonconfrontational cases.83  In this case, a battered woman shot her abusive 
husband as he slept.84  The trial court allowed testimony of the history of abuse 
in the marriage to help the jury determine whether the defendant reasonably 
perceived danger from her husband.85  However, the Kansas Supreme Court 
made clear that an objective standard of reasonableness must be used when 
measuring a defendant’s actions.86 
The court established a two-part standard for self-defense87 that requires 
use of a subjective standard “to determine whether the defendant sincerely and 
 
 79 Dressler, supra note 13, at 461–62 (“[A]ppellate courts have only rarely authorized a jury instruction 
on self-defense in nonconfrontational circumstances.”). 
 80 Id. at 461. 
 81 OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 10, at 147–48. 
 82 Anannya Bhattacharjee, Private Fists and Public Force: Race, Gender, and Surveillance, in POLICING 
THE NATIONAL BODY: SEX, RACE AND CRIMINALIZATION 1, 15 (Jael Silliman & Anannya Bhattacharjee eds., 
2002). 
 83 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988). 
 84 Id. at 575. 
 85 Id. at 579. 
 86 See id. (disapproving a subjective standard of reasonableness). 
 87 Id. 
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honestly believed it necessary to kill in order to defend” herself.88  Then, an 
objective standard must be used to determine whether a reasonable person in 
the defendant’s circumstances would have perceived self-defense as 
necessary.89  With this hybrid test, the court recognized that some subjectivity 
is appropriate in the reasonable person standard.90  However, such 
“subjectivization” should be limited to certain characteristics of the battered 
defendant—for example, the defendant’s physical size, ability to defend 
herself, and relevant experiences with the abuser.91 
The court went on to hold that in a nonconfrontational case such as this, the 
requirements of self-defense could never be met because a sleeping spouse 
could never pose an imminent danger to a battered woman, and thus she could 
never reasonably fear imminent harm.92  Therefore, a self-defense instruction 
cannot be given to the jury under such circumstances.93  Furthermore, the court 
believed that “[t]o hold otherwise . . . would in effect allow the execution of 
the abuser for past or future acts and conduct.”94  In a later Kansas case, State 
v. Cramer, the state court of appeals rejected the argument that the objective 
test requires the jury to consider “whether a reasonably prudent battered 
woman would have perceived self-defense as necessary.”  The court also 
reiterated that the jurisdiction did not recognize such a standard.95 
After reviewing Kansas Supreme Court jurisprudence, the appeals court 
concluded that any previous discussion by the high court about using “an 
objective test of how a reasonably prudent battered woman would react” was 
merely dicta, and juries were not required to receive instructions along these 
lines.96  According to the court of appeals, creating a more subjective standard 
of reasonableness for battered women would be tantamount to giving such 
women an unfair advantage over other defendants relying on self-defense.97   
 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Dressler, supra note 56, at 269; see also State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558–59 (Wash. 1977) (noting 
that self-defense requires consideration of all circumstances surrounding the event, such as the defendant’s 
sex, height, or disability). 
 92 Stewart, 763 P.2d at 578. 
 93 Id. at 579. 
 94 Id. 
 95 State v. Cramer, 841 P.2d 1111, 1117 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96 Id. at 1118. 
 97 See id. (noting that adoption of a “reasonably prudent battered woman” standard would represent a 
modification of the law of self-defense that is “more generous to one suffering from the battered woman’s 
syndrome than to any other defendant relying on self-defense”). 
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Courts in majority jurisdictions, like the Stewart court, are thus reluctant to 
find that a battered woman who preemptively kills her batterer acts in self-
defense because doing so would require an expansion of the traditional self-
defense requirements.98  These courts decline to recognize any such expansion, 
however slight, because they believe it signals approval of the woman’s 
actions, encourages violent self-help, and undermines the rule of law.99  Thus, 
in a majority of jurisdictions the BWS theory does little to help battered 
women who kill in nonconfrontational cases.100  If a jury is not allowed to 
consider self-defense in a nonconfrontational case, there is little choice but to 
convict because there is often no question that the battered woman had the 
culpable state of mind required for homicide—it was her intent to kill her 
batterer.101 
B. Accommodation of BWS in Minority Jurisdictions 
Because the battered woman who kills in a nonconfrontational situation is 
not an objectively reasonable actor—according to a conventional 
understanding of the term—her actions appear disproportionate to the harm 
posed at the time of the killing.102  Despite this, the current moral climate of 
sympathy for battered women103 has inspired some judges and juries to 
completely excuse deliberate, intentional killings, even though they may be 
styled as unconventionally defensive.  Recognizing the flaws in the majority 
approach, a minority of jurisdictions have expanded traditional self-defense 
law in an attempt to better accommodate battered women who preemptively 
kill their abusers.104  This expansion of self-defense law has most often come 
through a stretching of the reasonable person standard.105  Since BWS was 
introduced into the courts, a growing legal trend favors “subjectivizing” this 
objective standard.106 
 
 98 See Dressler, supra note 56, at 269 (“Put simply, without distorting the meaning of reasonableness 
beyond sensible recognition, a ‘reasonable person’ does not fear instantaneous death from a sleeping person.”). 
 99 See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988) (finding that a self-defense instruction would 
be tantamount to allowing “the execution of the abuser for past and future acts and conduct” and “‘would 
amount to a leap into the abyss of anarchy’” (quoting Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 997 (Wyo. 1984))). 
 100 See Stewart, 763 P.2d at 576–79. 
 101 PAUL H. ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CONVICT? 146–47 (1999). 
 102 See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL 140 (2007). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Dressler, supra note 13, at 458 (noting a growing trend in a minority of jurisdictions to allow battered 
women who kill in nonconfrontational situations to assert self-defense). 
 105 See, e.g., Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 11 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (“[W]e deem it necessary to modify 
[the self-defense instruction] by striking the words ‘reasonably’ and ‘reasonable’ from such instruction.”). 
 106 Dressler, supra note 13, at 458. 
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The North Dakota Supreme Court decision in State v. Leidholm illustrates 
one version of this more subjective standard.107  In Leidholm, a battered 
woman stabbed her abusive husband as he slept.108  Though the trial judge 
instructed the jury on self-defense, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that 
the instruction did not adequately emphasize a subjective standard.109 
The Leidholm court approved a highly subjective standard of 
reasonableness, finding that a self-defense instruction should require the jury to 
measure “the reasonableness of an accused’s belief . . . against the accused’s 
subjective impressions and not against the impressions which a jury might 
determine to be objectively reasonable.”110  The court further held that the 
defendant’s actions should be evaluated from “the standpoint of a person 
whose mental and physical characteristics are like the accused’s and who sees 
what the accused sees and knows what the accused knows.”111 
The court specifically found that the defendant’s conduct should not be 
judged by what a “reasonably cautious person” would do under similar 
circumstances, but rather what the defendant herself “honestly believed and 
had reasonable ground to believe was necessary for [her] to do to protect 
[herself] from apprehended death or great bodily injury.”112  This standard 
requires a jury to consider the defendant’s history of battering and to take into 
account the abusive relationship when deciding whether she acted 
reasonably.113  Thus, evidence of BWS could show that a battered woman 
might honestly and reasonably believe that her abuser would kill her when he 
awakened, given his threats and prior abusive actions.114 
 
 107 State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983). 
 108 Id. at 814. 
 109 Id. at 818–19. 
 110 Id. at 821. 
 111 Id. at 818. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 819–20. 
 114 Similar to minority American jurisdictions, the Canadian Supreme Court has held that BWS evidence 
should be used to inform the objective reasonableness of a battered woman defendant’s perceptions and 
actions, even in nonconfrontational cases.  In R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.), the Court rejected the 
notion that a battered woman must wait until the physical assault is underway before she can validly use force 
and assert self-defense.  The Court further held that expert evidence of BWS is relevant to an assessment of 
whether the defendant acted “on reasonable grounds.”  Id. at 882.  In Malott v. The Queen, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 
123, 132–34 (Can.), the Canadian Supreme Court affirmed the Lavallee decision.  A concurring opinion in 
Malott noted that Lavallee implicitly accepted that the experiences and perspectives of men and women in 
relation to self-defense may differ and thus must be reflected in self-defense law.  Malott, 1 S.C.R. at 141 
(L’Heureux-Dubé, J., concurring). 
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Such a standard potentially allows a battered woman to successfully claim 
self-defense largely on her word.115  If the jury believes her, and finds that 
other battered women in the same situation would have acted similarly, the 
defendant’s actions could be seen as justified, and she could be acquitted on 
self-defense grounds, no matter how inaccurate or objectively unreasonable her 
belief that she was in imminent danger.116  Minimizing the objective element 
of self-defense law in this way can result in unjust outcomes because it 
emphasizes the defendant’s state of mind while deemphasizing the severity of 
her actions.117  This has never been the intent of self-defense law; rather, this 
bears a strong resemblance to an excuse defense.118 
C. Practical Effects of the Current American Approach 
As this Comment has discussed, neither the majority nor minority approach 
is satisfactory.  A battered woman who kills her sleeping abuser in a majority 
jurisdiction has technically broken the law because she faced no objectively 
reasonable, imminent threat at the time she killed.119  Thus, in keeping with 
traditional self-defense law, the majority approach would find that she could 
not have killed in self-defense and therefore should be punished.120 
Nevertheless, if a battered woman honestly believed it was necessary to kill 
her abuser, even if her belief was not entirely reasonable, she does not seem as 
blameworthy as someone who killed without such a belief.121  Therefore, her 
actions do not appear to warrant a murder conviction and the social stigma that 
 
 115 See OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 10, at 113 (“The subjective test is a weak one, giving great latitude to 
the defendant’s perceptions if the jury simply believes that the defendant perceived things as she testified she 
did.”). 
 116 Id. at 107. 
 117 Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 121, 149 (1985). 
 118 See Dressler, supra note 13, at 463 (noting that “justifications focus on the act; excuses focus on the 
actor”).  In criminal law terms, self-defense is a justification.  Id. at 461.  Battered women’s syndrome does not 
fit well within the self-defense theory because it fundamentally emphasizes an excuse defense rather than a 
justification defense.  SCHNEIDER, supra note 73, at 135–36.  Thus, using BWS to justify the actions of women 
who preemptively kill their batterers by invoking self-defense necessarily distorts self-defense law.  Dressler, 
supra note 13, at 461–63.  See also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense 
Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986), reprinted in 
APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN’S LIVES 311, 318 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996). 
 119 See Dressler, supra note 13, at 461. 
 120 See State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 576–79 (Kan. 1988). 
 121 ROBINSON, supra note 101, at 151. 
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attaches to such punishment.122  In contrast, the minority approach allows a 
self-defense claim and evidence of BWS in “sleeping abuser” cases.123  While 
such an approach may give a battered woman the opportunity for acquittal, the 
use of BWS to stretch traditional legal concepts of self-defense is problematic.  
This section further explores the practical implications resulting from both 
barring a battered woman’s self-defense claim and expanding self-defense law 
to advance substantive justice for battered women. 
1. Problems with the Majority Approach 
a. Clemency for Battered Women Who Kill 
Since most jurisdictions do not allow battered women who kill in 
nonconfrontational situations to successfully plead self-defense, it is not 
surprising that a large number of clemencies have been granted to battered 
women who were denied the opportunity to present evidence of BWS at trial or 
were unable to get a jury instruction on self-defense.124  The “clemency 
movement”125 for battered women prisoners first gained recognition in 
December 1990, when Ohio Governor Richard Celeste issued pardons to 
twenty-five battered women convicted of killing or assaulting their batterers.126  
Shortly thereafter, Governor William Schaefer of Maryland granted clemency 
to eight battered women incarcerated for killing their abusers.127  The 
governors of several other states, including Colorado, California, Illinois, and 
Florida, followed suit by granting clemency to battered women convicted of 
 
 122 See Suzanne Uniacke, What Are Partial Excuses to Murder?, in PARTIAL EXCUSES TO MURDER 1, 15 
(Stanley Meng Heong Yeo ed., 1991) (“[T]he label ‘murderer’ carries a very great social stigma . . . .”). 
 123 See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 819–20 (N.D. 1983) (holding that evidence of the abuse 
should be admitted to allow the jury to decide if the woman acted reasonably). 
 124 Christine Noelle Becker, Comment, Clemency for Killers? Pardoning Battered Women Who Strike 
Back, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 297, 327–37 (1995).  Clemency is the “official use of the executive power to 
reduce the severity of a punishment at the discretion of the executive.”  KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: 
JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 5 (1989).  Executive clemency acts as a “fail safe” mechanism in 
the death penalty system.  Austin Sarat, Memorializing Miscarriages of Justice: Clemency Petitions in the 
Killing State, in WHEN LAW FAILS: MAKING SENSE OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 229, 231 (Charles J. 
Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2009). 
 125 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 73, at 145–46 (discussing the “clemency movement[s]” in several states 
benefiting battered women who have killed). 
 126 See Isabel Wilkerson, Clemency Granted to 25 Women Convicted for Assault or Murder, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 22, 1990, §1, at 1 (discussing the mass pardons granted by then-Ohio Governor Richard Celeste). 
 127 See Howard Schneider, Maryland to Free Abused Women; Schaefer Commutes 8 Terms, Citing 
Violence, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1991, at A1 (discussing the pardons issued by then-Maryland Governor 
William Donald Schaefer). 
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killing their abusers.128  These events not only suggest a widespread 
recognition of the problems faced by battered women charged with homicide, 
but also reveal deep dissatisfaction with the current majority approach.129 
b. Jury Nullification 
In a homicide case with a battered woman defendant, jurors may be 
presented with a choice between two extreme outcomes: convict the woman of 
murder or completely acquit her on self-defense grounds.130  Self-defense is a 
complete defense,131 but if a battered woman has not technically met the 
requirements of the defense, she risks being convicted as an intentional 
killer.132  Nevertheless, jurors and society may feel that even if the battered 
woman’s actions were objectively unreasonable, they were understandable, 
and thus the jurors may be unwilling to convict her of a culpable intentional 
homicide.133 
Through jury nullification, juries have the ability to acquit battered women 
defendants or convict them of lesser charges—even if the law technically 
requires a murder conviction.134  Jury nullification occurs when jurors refuse to 
follow the law and instead reach a result that is in accord with their own 
feelings of justice.135  When a jury nullifies evidentiary standards, it sends a 
message that it is unwilling to impose the outcome dictated by current law.136 
 
 128 SCHNEIDER, supra note 73, at 146. 
 129 Id. at 145. 
 130 See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 816 (N.D. 1983) (finding that a jury could determine that a 
battered wife’s use of deadly force could be “justified or excused”). 
 131 LAFAVE, supra note 22, at 539. 
 132 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE 54 (1988) (noting the “all-or-nothing” approach 
of self-defense). 
 133 See STARK, supra note 102, at 140–41 (noting that some juries look for ways to excuse a battered 
woman defendant’s behavior and that some courts have “reconstitut[ed] the [heat of passion] defense” in order 
to “meet changing community beliefs halfway”). 
 134 See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS 93 (1996) (discussing the history of jury 
nullification); ALBERT R. ROBERTS, CRITICAL ISSUES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE 295 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the 
jury’s “power to acquit the defendant of all charges or convict the defendant of lesser included charges”); see 
also JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 61–64 (1994) (discussing the jury nullification doctrine and noting a 
jury’s “raw power to pardon lawbreaking because there is no device for reversing a jury that insists on 
acquitting a defendant against the law”). 
 135 Jury nullification “occurs when a jury—based on its own sense of justice or fairness—refuses to 
follow the law and convict in a particular case even though the facts seem to allow no other conclusion but 
guilt.”  DERSHOWITZ, supra note 134, at 93 (quoting federal district judge Jack B. Weinstein). 
 136 PHILIP P. PURPURA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 100 (1997) (noting that jury nullification “sends a message” 
that a jury disagrees with the law or how it is applied); see 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 960 
(David Levinson ed., 2002) (discussing reasons why a jury might engage in jury nullification). 
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In battered women cases, juries sometimes do acquit defendants who have 
not established the legal requirements of self-defense.137  Nullification in those 
instances indicates that the current law is in tension with societal views and 
sentiments.138  As a result, jury nullification lends even more support to the 
claim that the current majority approach of using, but then denying, self-
defense for battered women is problematic. 
2. Problems with the Minority Approach: The “Pathology” of BWS 
Courts that accept BWS and expand traditional self-defense requirements 
believe that they are appropriately accommodating the battered woman’s 
situation.139  However, BWS concedes that a normal, reasonable person in the 
defendant’s situation would not have remained in the relationship until the 
point where deadly force was necessary140—thus it admits that the battered 
woman did not act reasonably according to conventional frameworks. 
Professor Anne Coughlin, a critic of BWS, has observed that the syndrome 
“defines the woman as a collection of mental symptoms, motivational deficits, 
and behavioral abnormalities; indeed, the fundamental premise of the defense 
is that women lack the psychological capacity to choose lawful means to 
extricate themselves from abusive mates.”141  Despite its best intentions, BWS 
reinforces the stereotypical idea that the battered woman is passive, helpless, 
and psychologically unable to escape a battering relationship.142  Under BWS, 
a battered woman who kills her abuser is someone out of touch with objective 
reality who acts as she does because she suffers from a cognitive disorder.143  
Even the use of the term “syndrome” emphasizes the woman’s abnormality.144  
 
 137 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 134, at 94 (“One contemporary manifestation of jury nullification . . . occurs 
in the context of the ‘battered woman syndrome.’  Although the law of self-defense is clear—a battered 
woman may kill or maim her batterer only if her life is in imminent danger and she has no other option, such 
as leaving or calling 911—several juries have acquitted battered women who did not meet these stringent 
criteria.”). 
 138 See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER 55 (1994) (noting that jury nullification points to 
a “tension between ‘the law’ and jurors’ ‘feelings of what is right and wrong’” (quoting SAUL M. KASSIN & 
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 158 (1988))). 
 139 See, e.g., Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 12 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (analogizing the battered woman to 
a hostage and finding that a battered woman should be allowed to claim self-defense successfully if she kills 
her batterer, even in a nonconfrontational case). 
 140 See Coughlin, supra note 74, at 54–55. 
 141 Id. at 7. 
 142 Dressler, supra note 56, at 268. 
 143 Coughlin, supra note 74, at 7, 52. 
 144 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 76, at vii (“[T]he word ‘syndrome’ may be misleading, by 
carrying connotations of pathology or disease, or . . . it may create a false perception that the battered woman 
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This undermines the very purpose of BWS, which is to show how a battered 
woman’s use of deadly self-help against her abuser is reasonable given the 
extraordinary circumstances.145  As a result, even the Department of Justice has 
concluded that the term “BWS” fails “to reflect the breadth of empirical 
knowledge now available concerning battering and its effects” and is therefore 
“no longer useful or appropriate.”146 
Allowing an expansion of traditional self-defense law by using BWS to 
help battered women, as minority jurisdictions have done, is unsatisfying 
because it emphasizes the stereotype of the “pathological woman.”  
Furthermore, stretching traditional self-defense requirements may encourage 
violent self-help and diminish the sanctity of human life by sending a message 
to society that the law sanctions killings that may have been avoidable.147  Yet, 
as demonstrated by mass clemencies and jury nullification in battered women 
cases, society is dissatisfied with the outcome of such cases in majority 
jurisdictions.  Because both approaches are clearly problematic, this Comment 
examines alternative solutions used in other common law countries to inform 
how the United States might more appropriately achieve justice for battered 
women. 
III.  TREATMENT OF BWS IN AUSTRALIA AND ENGLAND 
Soon after the use of expert evidence on BWS became widespread in 
America, foreign courts began to recognize BWS and develop varying 
approaches to accommodate such evidence under existing laws.148  This Part 
focuses on how Australia and England have adapted BWS within their 
respective laws governing self-defense or provocation.  Because of their 
similarity to our legal system, practices in common law systems such as 
 
‘suffers from’ a mental defect.”); Regina A. Schuller & Patricia A. Hastings, Trials of Battered Women Who 
Kill: The Impact of Alternative Forms of Expert Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 169 (1996) (finding 
that introducing BWS evidence at trial has the effect of “pathologizing” the abused woman in the minds of 
jurors); see also Osland v. The Queen (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316, 372–74 (Austl.) (Kirby, J., concurring) 
(discussing how the term “syndrome” is “designed to ‘medicalise’” a battered woman’s actions and concluding 
that “BWS denies the rationality of the victim’s response to prolonged abuse and instead presents the victim’s 
conduct as irrational and emotional”). 
 145 Osland, 197 C.L.R. at 374–75 (Kirby, J. concurring). 
 146 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 76, at vii. 
 147 See Dressler, supra note 13, at 468, 471 (discussing the moral messages that are sent to society when 
the traditional elements of self-defense are expanded). 
 148 For example, the Canadian Supreme Court relied heavily on the case of State v. Wanrow in its 
acceptance of BWS evidence to help inform the reasonableness element of self-defense.  See R. v. Lavallee, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, 874–75 (Can.). 
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Australia and England readily lend themselves to comparison with American 
law.149  As a result, American courts may learn how to better accommodate 
battered women defendants within the law by looking to the different strategies 
employed by these countries.150 
After assessing the two approaches, this Part rejects Australia’s approach of 
eliminating the imminence requirement in favor of England’s strategy of 
applying provocation law.  This Part also discusses the reforms to provocation 
law proposed by the English Government and examines how such reforms can 
more effectively assist battered women. 
A. Reasonableness and Imminence in Self-Defense: Australia 
Australia considers evidence of BWS under the law of self-defense to 
inform the subjective element of reasonableness.151  Due to Australia’s 
elimination of the technical imminence requirement in self-defense and recent 
reforms in at least one Australian state,152 at least four battered women 
defendants who killed in nonconfrontational situations have successfully 
claimed self-defense.153 
1. Case Law Developments 
Since the introduction of BWS evidence in the 1991 case of Runjanjic & 
Kontinnen, all Australian states and territories have accepted expert evidence 
of BWS.154  In cases involving battered women who kill, Australian courts 
recognize BWS as part of a self-defense strategy.155 
 
 149 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 3–4 (3d ed. 2007) 
(discussing the origins of the common law system in England and how it remains the prevailing legal system 
in Australia and the United States). 
 150 See, e.g., Sadiq Reza, Transnational Criminal Law and Procedure: An Introduction, 56 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 430, 442 (2006) (concluding that there is a need to consider a “range of approaches to common 
problems” by looking to the practices of other countries). 
 151 See Osland v. The Queen (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316, 337 (Austl.) (discussing the relationship between 
BWS evidence and the subjective element of reasonableness in self-defense). 
 152 The Australian state of Victoria passed new legislation updating their criminal laws in 2005.  Crimes 
(Homicide) Act 2005 § 9AH (Vict.), available at http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/ 
LDMS/PubStatbook.nsf/f932b66241ecf1b7ca256e92000e23be/F0B7C8D5D930EE26CA2570C1001F677F/$F
ILE/05-077a.pdf.  
 153 Julie Stubbs & Julia Tolmie, Falling Short of the Challenge? A Comparative Assessment of the 
Australian Use of Expert Evidence on the Battered Woman Syndrome, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 709, 733 (1999). 
 154 See R v. Runjanjic, (1991) 56 S.A. St. R. 114, 122 (Austl.) (permitting for the first time the use of 
expert evidence on BWS under the context of duress). 
 155 SUSAN S. M. EDWARDS, SEX AND GENDER IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 236 (1996). 
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The only High Court156 decision discussing treatment of BWS evidence in 
relation to self-defense is Osland v. The Queen.157  In Osland, the defendant 
and her son killed the defendant’s abusive husband while he slept.158  The 
Court noted that BWS evidence may be relevant to the issue of self-defense, 
particularly whether the battered woman believed her actions were necessary 
to avoid the risk of death or serious bodily injury.159  However, the Court 
focused solely on how BWS is relevant to the subjective component of self-
defense.160  The majority opinion noted that BWS could be relevant to 
determining the sincerity of the battered woman’s belief that she was at risk of 
death or serious bodily harm and that deadly force was necessary to avoid the 
threat.161  However, the majority opinion did not discuss how evidence of 
BWS might inform the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s actions.162  
A concurring opinion urged caution,163 stating that such evidence should only 
be viewed as forming part of all the evidence that must be considered by a 
judge or jury in determining whether the elements of provocation or self-
defense were met.164 
Australian jurisdictions have allowed evidence of BWS in several self-
defense cases.165 In some instances, the defendants were battered women who 
killed their abusers in the midst of an ongoing attack and were ultimately 
 
 156 The High Court is the Australian equivalent to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Elaine Thompson, Political 
Culture, in AMERICANIZATION AND AUSTRALIA 107, 110–11 (Philip Bell & Roger Bell eds., 1998). 
 157 (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316, 337–38. 
 158 Id. at 316. 
 159 Id. at 337 (“[E]xpert evidence of heightened arousal or awareness of danger may be directly relevant to 
self-defence . . . .”). 
 160 Stubbs & Tolmie, supra note 153, at 725. 
 161 Osland, 197 C.L.R. at 337.  The Court also briefly discussed how BWS evidence could be used to 
explain why an act of “apparently slight significance” might properly be as seen as evidence of provocation.  
Id. 
 162 Stubbs & Tolmie, supra note 153, at 725.  A concurring judgment in Osland did recognize that BWS 
evidence could show how a battered woman’s actions toward her abuser were objectively reasonable.  See 
Osland, 197 C.L.R. at 382 (Kirby, J., concurring) (“[BWS] evidence may assist a jury to understand, as self-
defensive, conduct which on one view occurred where there was no actual attack on the accused underway but 
rather a genuinely apprehended threat of imminent danger sufficient to warrant conduct in the nature of a pre-
emptive strike.”). 
 163 See id. at 375 (Kirby, J., concurring) (warning “of the need for caution in the reception of testimony 
concerning BWS” given the controversy surrounding it and its lack of universal acceptance).  See generally 
Barbara Ann Hocking, A Tale of Two Experts: The Australian High Court Takes a Cautious Stand, 64 J. CRIM. 
L. 245 (2000) (discussing the High Court’s decision in Osland). 
 164 Osland, 197 C.L.R. at 337–38. 
 165 See, e.g., Stubbs & Tolmie, supra note 153, at 733–35 (discussing several unreported Australian cases 
involving self-defense and BWS evidence); R v. Secretary (1996) 131 F.L.R. 124, 126 (Austl.). 
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acquitted.166  In addition, battered women defendants in at least four Australian 
cases have been acquitted on self-defense grounds, despite preemptively 
killing an abuser.167 
The most significant change to Australian law, and the most beneficial to 
battered defendants, has been the elimination of imminence as a technical 
requirement in self-defense law.168  Unlike the American approach to self-
defense, in which imminence remains a key element of a defense to homicide, 
Australia has abandoned imminence as a requirement altogether.  As a result, 
some battered women defendants who kill in nonconfrontational circumstances 
have successfully claimed self-defense.169  For example, in R v. Secretary, a 
battered woman killed her husband as he slept.170  Prior to the killing, the 
deceased assaulted the defendant, threatened her with further violence in the 
future, and then fell asleep.171  The trial judge held that the defendant could not 
raise self-defense because self-defense law requires that the danger be 
imminent, and the aggressor have an “actual or apparent present ability to 
effect his purpose.”172  However, the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Northern 
Territory held that the law did not require imminence.173  Instead, a continuing 
or incomplete threat of future harm might be sufficient to justify a defendant 
taking action to protect herself against the threat.174  In holding that a battered 
woman could successfully raise a self-defense claim even when she kills a 
sleeping abuser, the court noted that the “common law has moved away from 
the requirement of immediacy, favoring a more flexible approach in the law 
relating to . . . self defence.”175  Of course, the question of whether the threat 
justified the defendant’s use of deadly force remained.176  Thus, the history of 
 
 166 See Katrina Budrikis, Note on Hickey: The Problems with a Psychological Approach to Domestic 
Violence, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 365, 366–72 (1993) (discussing R v. Hickey, an unreported Australian self-
defense case in which a battered woman defendant who killed her abuser in a confrontational situation was 
acquitted). 
 167 Stubbs & Tolmie, supra note 153, at 733–35. 
 168 See Zecevic v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions (1987) 162 C.L.R. 645, 646, 663 (Austl.) (modifying existing 
self-defense law by eliminating a technical imminence requirement). 
 169 Stubbs & Tolmie, supra note 153, at 733. 
 170 131 F.L.R. at 124. 
 171 Id. at 128. 
 172 Id. at 124, 128. 
 173 Id. at 132. 
 174 Id. (finding no reason why the assault would be complete “merely because the deceased was 
temporarily physically unable to carry out his threat”). 
 175 Id. (citation omitted). 
 176 Id. at 126. 
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the relationship and the effect of BWS were relevant factors for a jury to 
consider in determining whether the defendant sincerely apprehended harm.177 
2. Recent Reforms 
More recently, at least one Australian state has enacted reforms in response 
to increased awareness and understanding of the incidence and nature of 
domestic violence and the realities battered women face.  In 2005, the State of 
Victoria passed the Crimes (Homicide) Act.178 The Act states that: 
[F]or the purposes of murder, defensive homicide or manslaughter, in 
circumstances where family violence is alleged a person may believe, 
and may have reasonable grounds for believing, that his or her 
conduct is necessary—(a) to defend himself or herself or another 
person . . . even if—(c) he or she is responding to a harm that is not 
immediate; or (d) his or her response involves the use of force in 
excess of the force involved in the harm or threatened harm.179 
The Act further notes that evidence of abuse is relevant in determining whether 
the person acted under the belief that the conduct was necessary and had 
reasonable grounds for that belief.180 
Under the Act, a battered woman may successfully claim self-defense if she 
shows that she killed to defend herself against further abuse and reasonably 
believed her actions were necessary, even if the harm was not imminent.181  
Thus, the reforms are consistent with the Australian High Court’s elimination 
of the imminence requirement.182  The reforms also give a battered woman 
defendant the opportunity to introduce evidence of BWS to show that her 
actions were objectively reasonable.183  Furthermore, if the Act is interpreted 
broadly enough, a woman in a continuously abusive relationship will have 
little problem establishing self-defense, even if she kills a sleeping abuser, 
because she can show the pattern of abuse and argue that she was responding 
to an ongoing threat. 
 
 177 The defendant was ultimately acquitted.  See Stubbs & Tolmie, supra note 153, at 735 (discussing the 
Secretary case). 
 178 Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 § 9AH (Vict.). 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. §§ 9AC, 9AH(3). 
 181 Id. § 9AC. 
 182 See Zecevic v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions (1987) 162 C.L.R. 645, 663. 
 183 Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 §§ 9AC, 9AH(3) (Vict.). 
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3. Problems with the Australian Approach 
Despite making it easier to acquit battered women defendants who kill in 
nonconfrontational situations, Australia’s relaxation of the traditional self-
defense requirements still poses problems.  First, by distinguishing and 
separating them from other persons who kill, laws like the one in Victoria 
encourage the perception that battered defendants need their own separate 
defense.184 Such a legal defense gives battered women an unfair advantage 
simply because they are battered women, but this is not and should not be a 
justification for homicide.185  A “battered woman defense” is based entirely on 
a battered woman’s perceptions and completely removes the objective standard 
of reasonableness, thus creating a risk of encouraging conduct that might be 
completely unnecessary or erroneous.186  It is dangerous to adopt a model that 
encourages the law to stretch the traditional concepts of self-defense to 
accommodate only battered women. 
Second, Australia’s elimination of the imminence requirement removes an 
important restraint on self-defense homicides.187  By relaxing the imminence 
requirement, Australia’s approach increases the possibility that battered 
women who kill out of revenge or anger, rather than fear of serious bodily 
harm or death, will successfully claim self-defense.188  While in some cases the 
imminence requirement may seem unjust, it remains a “crucial limitation on 
the right to violent self-help.”189  If the use of deadly force is authorized other 
than as a last resort, there is a greater risk that the threat is actually non-
existent, and thus deadly force is unwarranted.190  According to Professor 
Joshua Dressler, such a radical change in the law could promote a “criminal 
defence that categorically justifies the taking of life before it is immediately 
necessary.”191  No matter how morally reprehensible the conduct of the murder 
 
 184 See Renée Römkens, Ambiguous Responsibilities: Law and Conflicting Expert Testimony on the 
Abused Woman Who Shot Her Sleeping Husband, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 355, 363 n.9 (2000). 
 185 Id.; EWING, supra note 12, at 78–79 (discussing the absence of a “battered woman syndrome defense” 
as a separate legal defense). 
 186 See Rosen, supra note 15, at 21 (“To hold, as the battered woman’s defense requires, that the actor’s 
own experiences and psychological makeup should be considered in determining whether an act is justified is 
entirely inconsistent with the theory that a justified act is either beneficial or not harmful to society.”). 
 187 See id. at 53 (discussing the rationale behind the imminence requirement). 
 188 See Whitley R.P. Kaufman, Self-Defense, Imminence, and the Battered Woman, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 
342, 365 (2007) (noting that the imminence rule limits the use of self-defense when the defendant kills out of 
anger or revenge). 
 189 Id. at 369. 
 190 Dressler, supra note 13, at 467–68. 
 191 Dressler, supra note 56, at 275. 
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victim, to justify the taking of human life unnecessarily reduces the sacredness 
of human life.192  Ultimately, removing the imminence requirement is not the 
best solution because it undermines the criminal law’s goals of promoting the 
value of human life and discouraging self-help. 
B. Broadening Provocation: England 
Unlike American and Australian courts, English courts have taken a 
provocation-oriented approach to BWS evidence.193  The courts have generally 
been reluctant to consider BWS evidence in self-defense claims;194 instead, in 
cases involving battered women who kill abusive partners, provocation has 
been commonly used as a partial defense195 to murder in nonconfrontational 
circumstances.196  This section will discuss the English courts’ recognition of 
the need to broaden provocation to more accurately reflect the situational 
realities of battered women.  Such broadening has been achieved through 
modification of the common law as well as recent governmental reforms. 
1. Case Law Developments 
Under the current English law, for a provocation defense to succeed there 
must be conduct “which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually 
causes in the accused, a ‘sudden’ and ‘temporary’ loss of self-control.”197  
There are both subjective and objective elements to the partial defense.  
Subjectively, the conduct must have actually provoked the defendant to kill.  
Objectively, the conduct must be of the type that would have provoked a 
reasonable person to lose his normal self-control.198 
 
 192 Dressler, supra note 13, at 468. 
 193 See Dressler, supra note 56, at 261 (noting that BWS has less support in England than in the United 
States, Canada, or Australia but is admissible to mitigate a homicide to manslaughter on provocation grounds). 
 194 See EDWARDS, supra note 155, at 245 (“[English and Welsh] courts are reluctant to entertain self-
defence and decidedly averse to admitting evidence relating to battered woman syndrome.”). 
 195 A partial defense mitigates criminal responsibility but does not provide a complete defense.  
Provocation, as a partial defense, reduces a murder charge to voluntary manslaughter.  See Finbarr McAuley, 
Provocation: Partial Justification, Not Partial Excuse, in PARTIAL EXCUSES TO MURDER, supra note 122, at 
19, 19 (explaining that provocation is a “partial and limited defence”). 
 196 EDWARDS, supra note 155, at 236; JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 186–87 
(1992) (noting statistics showing that in England 52.5% of women who killed their partners and were 
ultimately convicted of homicide were convicted only of manslaughter on the grounds of provocation). 
 197 R v. Duffy, (1949) 1 All E.R. 932, 932 (Crim. App.). 
 198 See, e.g., R. v. Smith, (2000) 4 All E.R. 289, 297 (H.L.) (discussing the subjective and objective 
elements of provocation law). 
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Fulfilling the requirement of a sudden and temporary loss of self-control is 
often difficult for battered women who kill, especially in cases where the 
deceased was sleeping or not actively posing a threat at the time of the 
killing.199  Under the traditional common law interpretation, provoked killings 
must be impulsive and happen quickly, usually immediately after the 
provoking act.200  However, in several cases, English courts have expanded 
parts of this requirement to accommodate women defendants who offer 
evidence of BWS.201 
R v. Ahluwalia202 was a landmark decision that changed how courts view 
the suddenness requirement of provocation.203  In Ahluwalia, the defendant’s 
relationship with the victim, her husband, was characterized by a long history 
of violence and abuse.204  The night of the killing, the defendant’s husband 
threatened to beat her the next morning.205  After a significant delay, during 
which the defendant’s husband went to sleep, the defendant set him on fire.206 
On appeal, the defendant’s lawyers argued that when a battered woman is 
provoked, a delayed response between the final provocative conduct and the 
killing might not signal a “cooling-off” but rather a “slow-burn” reaction207 in 
which the defendant does not actually regain self-control.208  The court of 
appeal agreed, holding that a provocation defense will not fail simply because 
there was a delayed response.209  Thus, the court’s decision in Ahluwalia 
opened the way for a battered woman to plead provocation as a partial defense 
to murder, even if the killing was committed after a delayed response.  Most 
 
 199 HORDER, supra note 196, at 187–91. 
 200 George Mousourakis, Defending Victims of Domestic Abuse Who Kill: A Perspective from English 
Law, 48 LE CASHIERS DE DROIT 351, 357 (2007). 
 201 See, e.g., R v. Thornton (No. 2), (1996) 2 All E.R. 1023, 1030 (Crim. App.); R v. Humphreys, (1995) 4 
All E.R. 1008, 1023–24 (Crim. App.). 
 202  (1992) 4 All E.R. 889 (Crim. App.). 
 203 The case of R v. Thornton (No. 1), (1992) 1 All E.R. 306 (Crim. App.), decided the year before 
Ahluwalia, raised for the first time whether courts could consider cumulative provocation, rather than focusing 
exclusively on a “sudden and temporary” loss of control, in the case of battered defendants.  WENDY CHAN, 
WOMEN, MURDER AND JUSTICE 118 (2001). 
 204 Ahluwalia, 4 All E.R. at 891–92. 
 205 Id. at 892–93. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. at 895–96; cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).  The 
Model Penal Code approach, which is recognized in a few U.S. jurisdictions, allows a defendant to be found 
guilty of manslaughter if she acted as a result of an “extreme . . . emotional disturbance,” a concept which does 
not require a defendant to have committed the killing before cooling off.  Id. 
 208 Ahluwalia, 4 All E.R. at 895–96. 
 209 Id.  The court did note, however, that a provocation defense would be less likely to succeed the longer 
the delay.  Id. 
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importantly, the court also found that expert testimony on BWS is admissible 
and relevant to a jury’s understanding of the long-term effects of battering, 
though its allowance of BWS evidence focused on the defendant’s mental state 
rather than on her partner’s violence.210 
The court of appeal further discussed the relevance of long-term abuse to 
provocation in R v. Humphreys211 and R v. Thornton (No. 2).212  Emma 
Humphreys was convicted of murdering her boyfriend after he taunted her for 
failing to commit suicide.213  Though the defense presented evidence that the 
deceased had frequently abused the defendant, the judge directed the jury to 
focus on events immediately surrounding the killing in determining whether 
her loss of self-control was reasonable.214  However, the court of appeal 
substituted manslaughter for murder, holding that the whole history of the 
abusive relationship was relevant to the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and the 
deceased’s prior violence and threats should have been presented to the jury as 
constituting part of the provocative conduct—not merely as background to the 
taunting.215  Humphreys resolved prior inconsistencies by concluding that a 
period of cumulative provocation culminating in a loss of self-control is 
relevant and should be considered by a jury.216 
In Thornton (No. 2),217 which followed the decision in Humphreys, the 
court of appeal found for the first time that BWS could be relevant in a jury’s 
consideration of provocation as a partial defense to murder218 and a jury’s 
assessment of the objective reasonableness and sincerity of the loss of self-
control on the part of the defendant.219  The court reiterated that BWS might 
 
 210 Id. at 896–99.  Ahluwalia was groundbreaking in its allowance of BWS and was the first time that the 
Court of Appeals admitted evidence of BWS in an appeal against a conviction for murder.  Ultimately, 
however, the court only considered evidence of BWS under the doctrine of diminished responsibility.  
EDWARDS, supra note 155, at 246–47. 
 211 (1995) 4 All E.R. 1008, 1012, 1021–22 (Crim. App.) 
 212 (1996) 2 All E.R. 1023, 1029–30 (Crim. App.). 
 213 Humphreys, 4 All E.R. at 1010, 1012. 
 214 Id. at 1014. 
 215 Id. at 1023–24. 
 216 See generally Donald Nicolson & Rohit Sanghvi, More Justice for Battered Women, 146 NEW L.J. 
1122 (1995) (discussing Humphreys). 
 217 Thornton (No. 2), 2 All E.R. at 1023.  Thornton was a battered woman who killed her husband while 
he lay on the couch after she had admittedly “calm[ed] down.”  Id. at 1026. 
 218 EDWARDS, supra note 155, at 247. 
 219 Thornton (No. 2), 2 All E.R. at 1029–30. 
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demonstrate how a period of habitual abuse results in a “slow-burn” effect that 
over time culminates in a loss of control.220 
Following the approach developed from Ahluwalia to Thornton (No. 2), 
English courts currently allow battered defendants significant opportunity to 
put forth evidence of circumstances and characteristics relevant to 
provocation.221  In addition, though the traditional requirement of a “sudden” 
loss of self-control remains, some courts have accommodated cumulative 
provocation where there is evidence of battering and a “slow-burn” 
response.222 
Nevertheless, the current approach of English courts to accommodate 
battered women who kill within the law of provocation is problematic because 
courts have attempted to stretch the notions of suddenness and reasonableness 
within existing traditional laws, creating a palpable tension within the law that 
can lead to inconsistency.223  Because the traditional defense of provocation 
was primarily intended to deal with killings triggered by anger, and was 
premised on notions of masculine behavior, continued difficulties arise when 
attempting to accommodate evidence of battering and its effects on women 
within current provocation law.224 
2. Proposed Government Reforms 
The English government recently proposed reforms to the law of 
manslaughter and murder in ways that would directly impact battered women 
who kill their abusive partners.225  The reforms propose replacing the existing 
common law partial defense of provocation with two new partial defenses to 
murder that would apply only in exceptional circumstances: killing in response 
 
 220 Id.; see also HORDER, supra note 196, at 188–89 (noting that, historically, the provocation defense was 
not available to an individual subjected to provocative acts over an extended period of time). 
 221 See EDWARDS, supra note 155, at 247–48 (discussing the “expansion of the concept of the reasonable 
man” in England). 
 222 See, e.g., R v. Ahluwalia, (1992) 4 All E.R. 889 (Crim. App.).  Despite the decisions in Ahluwalia, 
Humphreys, and Thornton, some commentators remain concerned about the problems resulting from the 
continued requirement that the defendant “must suddenly lose their self-control,” especially for those women 
who “tend to kill in an outwardly calm manner.”  See Nicolson & Sanghvi, supra note 216, at 1122. 
 223 CHAN, supra note 203, at 120. 
 224 See HORDER, supra note 196, at 192–94. 
 225 See generally U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER AND INFANTICIDE: PROPOSALS 
FOR REFORM OF THE LAW (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/murder-manslaughter-
infanticide-consultation.pdf (proposing, among other things, the replacement of current provocation with two 
new partial defenses to murder). 
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to a fear of serious violence and killing in response to words and conduct that 
caused the defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.226 
The reforms would affect the outcome of cases in which battered women 
who kill plead provocation.  Under the reformed partial defense, a defendant 
would be guilty of manslaughter if she killed as a result of a loss of self-control 
triggered by a fear of serious violence by the abuser.227  A jury would be 
required to determine whether a person of the defendant’s same sex and age 
with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint in the same circumstances 
would have acted in the same or similar way as the defendant.228  Thus, the 
reforms would abolish a need for a “sudden” loss of self-control and would 
allow the defense to be used if fear of an attack was not imminent. 
The government’s proposed reforms offer a more balanced approach to 
accommodating battered women than prior provocation law.  By recognizing 
that a woman who is the victim of prolonged abuse may not always act 
immediately following a threat or episode of abuse and that her response will 
usually be the result of fear and not anger,229 the reforms will likely produce 
more equitable results.  This is because battered women who kill in 
nonconfrontational situations will be able to argue provocation more 
effectively, thus avoiding a murder conviction.  Yet they will still be convicted 
of manslaughter and punished for their actions. 
Additionally, the reforms could significantly lessen the need for expert 
testimony on BWS because evidence that the battering and abuse actually took 
place would be enough to show that the woman had a legitimate fear of serious 
violence.230  Expert testimony on BWS could be limited to supporting the 
woman’s credibility with the jury, if used at all.231  As a result, concerns with 
problems that BWS creates, such as the battered woman stereotype and the 
“syndromization” of battered women, are also lessened.232  Indeed, because 
provocation is a “rational defense” based on the standard of what an ordinary 
person would do, the concern that a battered woman’s actions will be viewed 
 
 226 Id. at 2. 
 227 Id. at 33. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. at 8. 
 230 See Dressler, supra note 56, at 266 (noting that evidence of BWS is not always needed to explain to a 
jury why a battered woman reacted as she did). 
 231 See id. (“BWS testimony should be limited to enhancing the battered woman’s credibility . . . .”). 
 232 See, e.g., Schuller & Hastings, supra note 144. 
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as abnormal and irrational is further reduced.233  Thus, the proposed reforms 
would recognize that a battered woman defendant who killed her batterer in 
response to threats of serious violence acted reasonably. 
IV.  ARGUMENT FOR THE ADOPTION OF REFORMED PROVOCATION 
As explained above, the problems with the current U.S. approach of 
accommodating battered women defendants within traditional self-defense law 
are plentiful.  For a woman who preemptively kills her abuser to successfully 
claim self-defense, courts must expand the traditional legal requirements of 
self-defense.234  But expansion of self-defense law not only encourages violent 
self-help, it also diminishes the sanctity of human life by signifying that the 
law authorizes killings that may have been avoidable.235  Thus, when a battered 
woman kills outside of the traditional elements of self-defense, her actions 
should not be legally justified.236  However, as demonstrated by the mass 
clemencies granted to convicted battered women in recent years, it appears that 
the majority view in society is that women who kill in response to years of 
abuse should not be labeled “murderers.”237 
Provocation law provides a better solution than self-defense for helping 
battered women who kill sleeping abusers escape a murder conviction.  As a 
defense that partially excuses or justifies a defendant’s actions,238 provocation 
 
 233 Rebecca Bradfield, Women Who Kill: Lack of Intent and Diminished Responsibility as the Other 
‘Defences’ to Spousal Homicide, 13 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 143, 149 (2001). 
 234 See, e.g., State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818–19 (N.D. 1983) (deciding that a finder of fact must 
apply a subjective, rather than the traditionally objective, standard of reasonableness); Bechtel v. State, 840 
P.2d 1, 10–13 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (finding that in a battered woman case, the court should use a more 
subjective standard to determine whether the defendant acted in self-defense). 
 235 Dressler, supra note 13, at 467–68. 
 236 For example, the court in State v. Stewart recognized that to allow battered women who preemptively 
kill their abusers to successfully claim self-defense “would amount to a leap into the abyss of anarchy.”  763 
P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988).  Indeed, the distortion of the legal requirements has led some courts to impose 
inconsistent standards.  See, e.g., Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 11–12 (creating a special self-defense standard for 
battered women only and thus being more generous to battered women than to other defendants claiming self-
defense). 
 237 At least two commentators have noted that one would usually expect battered women who kill to be 
charged and convicted of an offense no higher than voluntary manslaughter.  In reality, many women are 
charged and convicted of murder because they appear to have “cooled off,” and thus fail to meet the 
requirements of the rule of provocation.  In addition, only a minority of jurisdictions allows a defendant to 
assert an imperfect self-defense claim.  See EWING, supra note 12, at 44–45; OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 10, at 
99. 
 238 See Caroline Forell, Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the United States, 
Canada and Australia, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 27, 55 n.158 (2006) (noting that provocation can 
be considered either a partial excuse or a partial justification). 
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recognizes the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct while finding that she 
is not entirely to blame and therefore should receive a reduced punishment.239  
Nevertheless, current provocation laws fail to consider certain realities of a 
battered woman’s situation and therefore must be reformed before they can 
adequately resolve the problems such women face in sleeping abuser cases. 
This Part will discuss the problems with current provocation law in the 
United States and propose a reformed provocation defense, similar to the 
provocation reforms proposed by the English government.  Next, this Part will 
further analyze the benefits of using provocation, rather than self-defense, in 
battered women’s cases.  Finally, this Part will discuss the implications of 
using a reformed provocation defense. 
A. Problems with Current Provocation Law 
Battered women who kill in nonconfrontational situations usually have 
great difficulty raising a traditional provocation defense.240  Just like self-
defense, provocation was created with male interactions and reactions in mind; 
as such, the partial defense was developed to deal with situations in which a 
man kills as a result of being provoked by some act, such as a wife’s 
infidelity.241  Current provocation law is based on the notion that an ordinary 
person may lose self-control when faced with adequate provocation.242  The 
American Law Institute has observed that this partial defense is basically a 
“concession to human weakness,”243 recognizing that a person acting out of 
passion is less able to control her actions and is less blameworthy than a person 
 
 239 See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL 
COURTROOM 227 (2003) (“The reason we allow the mitigation from murder to manslaughter [in provocation] 
is not because we think the act . . . is right or correct . . . but because we feel the actor is not entirely to blame 
for what happened.” (footnote omitted)). 
 240 See, e.g., Camille A. Nelson, (En)Raged or (En)Gaged: The Implications of Racial Context to the 
Canadian Provocation Defence, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1007, 1063–64 (2002) (noting the problems battered 
women face with a provocation defense). 
 241 See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 80–81 (1992) (discussing provocation and noting that, at common law, 
adultery was seen as “the highest form of provocation”). 
 242 See McAuley, supra note 195, at 20 (noting that provocation recognizes “that circumstances arise in 
which even the prudent individual may be unable to control her or his behaviour”). 
 243 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). 
BELEW GALLEYSFINAL 5/3/2010  12:19 PM 
800 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
who kills in a normal state of mind.244  Therefore, the defense reduces 
intentional homicide to voluntary manslaughter.245 
At common law, a provocation defense requires the actor to act (1) in the 
sudden heat of passion, (2) as a result of adequate provocation, and (3) without 
a reasonable opportunity to cool off.246  For a battered woman, the primary 
difficulty with using a provocation defense in its current form is the sudden 
“heat of passion” element, which does not allow for a “cooling off” period.247  
This element requires the killing to occur immediately or soon after the 
provoking act.248  If a reasonable person would have cooled off in the time that 
elapsed between the provocation and the fatal act, the “suddenness” 
requirement fails.249  The battered woman who kills a sleeping abuser is 
usually unable to meet such a requirement because of the very fact that she 
killed in a nonconfrontational situation instead of immediately after some 
provoking act.250 
Current provocation laws fail to take into account the complexities of a 
battered woman’s situation.  Battered women usually kill their batterers out of 
an accumulation of fear and despair rather than just anger.251  However, the 
primary emotion associated with “heat of passion” is anger or rage—the 
typical male reaction—and only some jurisdictions consistently include fear in 
their definition of “heat of passion.”252  Thus, while courts might recognize 
 
 244 Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1992 (2001) (“It is sometimes said that a 
person who commits a crime under the influence of emotion is less culpable than a person who acts calmly and 
deliberately.”). 
 245 See LEE, supra note 239, at 18. 
 246 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MURDER & VIOLENT CRIME 241 (Eric Hickey ed., 2003); LAFAVE, supra note 22, 
at 654.  The Model Penal Code (MPC) provides that murder will be mitigated to manslaughter if a homicide 
“is committed under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable 
explanation or excuse.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).  
The reasonableness of the actor’s explanation or excuse for the emotional disturbance is “determined from the 
viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.”  Id.  Notably, 
the MPC does not require that the defendant act before having an opportunity to “cool off.”  See LEE, supra 
note 239, at 34. 
 247 See EWING, supra note 12, at 45. 
 248 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MURDER & VIOLENT CRIME, supra note 246, at 241. 
 249 Id. 
 250 See HORDER, supra note 196, at 188–89; Nicolson & Sanghvi, supra note 216, at 1122. 
 251 See Marina Angel, Why Judy Norman Acted in Reasonable Self-Defense: An Abused Woman and a 
Sleeping Man, 16 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 65, 82 (2008) (identifying fear as the primary emotion felt by battered 
women who kill their abusers); Forell, supra note 238, at 34. 
 252 Coker, supra note 241, at 79; see also, e.g., Rebecca Bradfield, Is Near Enough Good Enough? Why 
Isn’t Self-Defence Appropriate for the Battered Woman?, 5 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 71, 75 (1998) (noting 
that anger is the primary emotion associated with provocation); Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Provocation’s 
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that fear is an emotion that is capable of inducing “heat of passion,” such 
language may disadvantage battered women who kill their batterers out of fear 
or desperation.253 
Nevertheless, battered women can react out of anger or frustration as 
well.254  The woman’s feelings of fear and anger accumulate slowly over time 
until she can no longer control herself.255  Often, there is not one triggering 
event that leads to the loss of control, but rather an accumulation of years of 
abuse and fear of the abuser.256  Thus, the history of the relationship between 
the battered woman and her abuser is relevant in considering the 
reasonableness of the woman’s reaction. 
B. Reformed Provocation 
Given the limitations of current provocation law, the defense must be 
reformed to take into account the reality of a battered woman’s situation.  The 
English government’s current proposal to reform provocation laws and make 
them more accessible to battered women is instructive to the United States for 
three reasons.  First, using a reformed provocation defense benefits battered 
women who kill in nonconfrontational situations by providing a partial defense 
to murder.  Second, taking BWS out of traditional self-defense law allows the 
laws of self-defense to remain intact.  Third, creating such a partial defense of 
reformed provocation will help balance certain principles of criminal 
punishment.  Thus, states should replace current provocation laws with a 
 
Privileged Desire: The Provocation Doctrine, “Homosexual Panic,” and the Non-Violent Unwanted Sexual 
Advance Defense, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 221 (2000) (“[R]age, not fear or terror, is the only 
legally recognized and criminally excusable definition of passionate emotion.”). 
 253 See Nelson, supra note 240, at 1063 (“Women in battering situations typically do not kill their abusers 
in the ‘heat of passion’ as traditionally contemplated by the defence.”). 
 254 See, e.g., Brenda Baker, Provocation as a Defence for Abused Women Who Kill, 11 CAN. J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 193, 198 (1998) (discussing the slow-burn effect of anger and frustration experienced by 
battered women who kill); Leigh Goodmark, The Punishment of Dixie Shanahan: Is There Justice for Battered 
Women Who Kill?, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 269, 300 n.222 (2007) (“Battered women kill out of fear rather than 
anger, although most battered women eventually feel anger toward their abusers.”). 
 255 This is known as “cumulative provocation,” which can be defined as: 
[A] series of acts or words over a period of time which culminate in the sudden and temporary 
loss of self-control by the accused.  Thus, provocation is not confined to the last act before the 
killing occurred; there may have been previous acts or words which, when added together, cause 
the accused to lose his self-control, although the last act on its own may not be sufficient to 
constitute provocation. 
MICHAEL ALLEN, TEXTBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 282 (8th ed. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 256 See Baker, supra note 254, at 198 (discussing cumulative provocation and the battered woman). 
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reformed provocation defense that mitigates murder to voluntary manslaughter 
if the defendant acted in response to a fear of serious violence, gross 
provocation, or a combination of both. 
1. The Proposal 
The English government’s provocation reform proposals provide a good 
example of a defense that could adequately accommodate battered women who 
kill.  Using these proposals as a guide, this Comment argues that state 
legislatures should replace current provocation laws with a reformed 
provocation defense that could take the following form: 
Where a defendant has committed homicide, that defendant is not to 
be convicted of murder, but rather voluntary manslaughter, if (a) the 
defendant’s actions resulted from her loss of self-control, (b) the loss 
of self-control was in response to adequate provocation, and (c) an 
ordinary person of the defendant’s sex and age, with a normal degree 
of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of the 
defendant, would have reacted in the same or in a similar way as the 
defendant did.  Adequate provocation means (1) a fear of serious 
violence from the victim against the defendant; or (2) a thing or 
things said or done which amounted to an exceptional happening, and 
caused the defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously 
wronged; or (3) a combination of both (1) and (2).257 
Creating a reformed partial defense of provocation that applies when a 
person kills in response to fear of serious violence would provide a tailored 
partial defense to murder for battered women who kill in nonconfrontational 
circumstances.  In instances where battered women cannot or should not 
receive a jury instruction on self-defense, the partial defense would make sure 
that women who reasonably lost their self-control in response to fear of serious 
violence would not be labeled “murderers” and would receive a lesser 
punishment.258  Such a defense would reflect compassion for the battered 
woman’s situation while at the same time providing for at least some 
punishment.  It also has the added benefit of applying to a wider class of 
defendants. 
 
 257 This language is quite similar to what the English government has proposed.  For the actual text of the 
British proposal, see U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 225, at 33 (proposing language for new partial 
defenses to murder). 
 258 See, e.g., MARY BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 206 (3d ed. 
2007) (noting that in 1999, for example, “the mean sentence length for manslaughter . . . was approximately 
half that of murder, and the mean time served for manslaughter was less than five years”). 
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The most beneficial result of such a defense would be the elimination of the 
“suddenness” requirement following the provoking act.259 A victim of 
sustained abuse who killed to thwart an anticipated but not imminent attack 
could claim that she killed out of fear of serious violence.  Therefore, even if 
an abuser was asleep at the time of the fatal act, a battered woman could be 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder, if she shows that she 
honestly anticipated a future attack because of past abusive episodes and 
threats.  In the case of an abuser who, before going to sleep, threatens to harm 
the battered woman when he wakes up (but makes no aggressive move at the 
time of the threat), the woman who kills him as he sleeps could potentially 
claim the defense on account of the gross provocation and fear of serious 
violence.260  Evidence of past threats and abusive episodes could support the 
battered woman’s fear and show how it was reasonable. 
2. Benefits of Using Provocation vs. Self-Defense 
Accommodating battered women who kill within the law of provocation, 
rather than self-defense, is preferable for several reasons.  First, in contrast to 
self-defense, which either wholly endorses or totally denies a justification of a 
battered woman’s actions, provocation recognizes that the battered woman’s 
actions were wrongful to some degree.261  Yet it acknowledges that she should 
not be fully blamed for killing her abuser.262  While provocation law 
recognizes human weakness, it does not encourage it.263  Thus, for a battered 
defendant, the partial defense appropriately distinguishes the circumstances 
surrounding a provoked homicide from the circumstances of a homicide that 
was either unavoidable or completely avoidable. 
Second, considering the actions of a battered woman who kills her abuser 
within a provocation defense can emphasize the reasonableness of the 
woman’s actions.  Like self-defense, provocation compares the defendant’s 
reaction to the way a reasonable, ordinary person would have reacted in the 
 
 259 See HORDER, supra note 196, at 190 (discussing the existence of the “suddenness” requirement in 
provocation as detrimental to battered women defendants). 
 260 Under current provocation law in most jurisdictions, words alone do not constitute adequate 
provocation.  See, e.g., Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 722 (Md. 1991) (noting that it is the 
“overwhelming[]” rule that words alone do not constitute adequate provocation). 
 261 See Rosen, supra note 15, at 22–24. 
 262 See id. at 23. 
 263 See McAuley, supra note 195, at 20 (stressing that while the law must “take cognisance of ordinary 
human weaknesses, it must be careful not to promote them”). 
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same circumstances.264  By using a provocation defense, the battered woman 
can argue that she acted as any ordinary person would, given the years of abuse 
and terror endured at the hands of her abuser. 
Though a battered defendant might still choose to use expert evidence of 
BWS, such testimony may not always be necessary to a provocation 
defense.265 Since BWS emphasizes the objective unreasonableness of a 
battered woman’s reactions, it could actually undermine any effort to establish 
that an ordinary person would react as the defendant did.266  Instead, the 
defendant herself could testify about the battering episodes and the 
circumstances she found herself in to help support the reasonableness of her 
actions.  If the woman’s reactions were deemed objectively reasonable, the 
provocation defense would succeed.267  Thus, using a provocation defense can 
rationalize, rather than pathologize, the woman’s behavior. 
Third, using the partial defense of provocation allows the battered woman 
to escape a murder conviction while still imposing some punishment for her 
actions.  This is necessary because by killing her abuser outside of the 
traditional rules of self-defense, the battered woman has broken the law; thus, 
the principle of retributivism requires that she be punished for her crime.268  
Other principles of criminal law find that a person should be punished only to 
deter crime.269  Though it is unlikely that a battered woman who kills her 
abuser will ever commit such a crime again,270 the defendant must nevertheless 
 
 264 See LEE, supra note 239, at 25–26 (discussing the comparison of the defendant to the “reasonable 
person” in provocation). 
 265 Though BWS was originally developed to support a self-defense claim, it might still be useful in a 
provocation defense.  For example, BWS evidence could still bolster a defendant’s credibility with the jury.  
See Carrie L. Hempel, Battered Women Who Strike Back: Using Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects 
in Homicide Trials, in SEXUALIZED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN: A PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 
PERSPECTIVE 71, 84 (B.J. Cling ed., 2004) (discussing how BWS can enhance a defendant’s credibility). 
 266 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 73, at 136. 
 267 See, e.g., Lawrence S. Lustberg & John V. Jacobi, The Battered Woman as Reasonable Person: A 
Critique of the Appellate Division Decision in State v. McClain, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 365, 380 n.77 (1992) 
(explaining that a successful provocation defense acknowledges that the defendant acted as any reasonable 
person would under the same circumstances). 
 268 Retributivist principles dictate that punishment is justified when a person “deserve[s] it.”  Kent 
Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347 (1983); see also John Rawls, Two Concepts 
of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4 (1955) (explaining that retributivism finds that “punishment is justified on the 
grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment”). 
 269 Utilitarian principles hold that punishment should only be imposed if it will provide an “overall benefit 
to society.”  WILLIAM WILSON, CENTRAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL THEORY 51 (2002). 
 270 Since a battered woman who kills her abuser is unlikely to repeat the crime, specific deterrence 
through punishment is unnecessary to prevent her from committing the same crime in the future.  See K. J. 
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be punished to send a message to society that the law will not condone such 
behavior.271  No matter how egregious a person’s conduct may be, human 
life—even a batterer’s life—is not simply expendable.272  By sending this 
message, the criminal law seeks to ensure that the sanctity of human life is 
respected.273  Imposing some punishment also makes it clear that violent self-
help is not encouraged.  Therefore, by mitigating a murder offense to 
manslaughter, which carries a lesser social stigma274 and a lesser sentence,275 
the goals of the criminal law are more effectively achieved. 
3. Implications of Reformed Provocation 
Reformed provocation doctrine would only provide a partial defense for 
battered women who preemptively kill their abusers, leaving such women to be 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter rather than receiving a full acquittal.  
Though at least some feminist proponents would not consider this outcome 
ideal,276 this result would lead to the most just outcomes by balancing society’s 
sympathy for the battered woman’s circumstances with the goals of the 
criminal law to discourage violent self-help and to preserve the sanctity of 
human life. 
The reformed provocation defense proposed here would replace the phrase 
“heat of passion” with “loss of self-control.”  Such language would implicitly 
accept that a person could kill out of emotions other than anger, for example 
 
WILSON, WHEN VIOLENCE BEGINS AT HOME 150 (2006) (“[O]nce released, women convicted of killing their 
abusive partners have an incredibly low recidivism rate.”). 
 271 This is the theory of general deterrence, which is based on “the idea that offenders are punished not to 
deter the offenders themselves, but to discourage other potential offenders.”  EAMONN CARRABINE ET AL., 
CRIMINOLOGY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 233 (2004). 
 272 See Dressler, supra note 13, at 457–65. 
 273 See, e.g., R v. Kirkham, (1837) 173 Eng. Rep. 422, 423–24 (K.B.) (“[The law] has at once a sacred 
regard for human life and also a respect for man’s failings . . . .  [T]hough the law condescends to human 
frailty, it will not indulge human ferocity.”). 
 274 See TONI PICKARD ET AL., DIMENSIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 441 (3d ed. 2002) (“[O]ne of the traditional 
justifications for punishment is the deterrent and educative impact of a criminal conviction—in other words, 
the stigma which accompanies it.”); Uniacke, supra note 122, at 15 ( a murder conviction “carries a very great 
social stigma”). 
 275 See LEE, supra note 239, at 18 (“A voluntary manslaughter conviction makes a huge difference in 
one’s possible sentence.”). 
 276 See generally Bradfield, supra note 252 (discussing the need for the use of self-defense, rather than 
provocation, in cases where battered women kill their abusers); Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women’s 
Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393 (1988) (arguing that battered women can and should be 
accommodated within self-defense law). 
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fear, frustration, and desperation.277  However, the “loss of self-control” 
requirement would not be much different from the current “heat of passion” 
element of provocation.  The requirement that the killing be done as a result of 
a loss of self-control would provide a safeguard against partially excusing 
defendants who kill out of desire for revenge—that is, cold-blooded, 
premeditated killings.278  Thus, if any evidence were presented that the 
defendant acted out of a premeditated desire for revenge, the defense would 
not apply.279 
The proposed defense would have the benefit of not requiring that the 
killing be committed immediately after a provoking act.  In this way, a battered 
woman defendant who kills in a nonconfrontational situation would still 
benefit from the defense if she could show that (1) there was a history of 
ongoing abuse committed by the deceased against her; (2) she legitimately 
feared serious violence from her abuser; and (3) this fear triggered her reaction.  
This loss of self-control element still has a reasonableness component, which 
compares the defendant’s reactions to that of a normal, “reasonable” person in 
the defendant’s shoes.280  Nevertheless, with a showing of past battering and 
abuse, and consideration of how a normal person would react in the 
defendant’s circumstances, a jury could reasonably find that the reformed 
provocation defense applies to the battered woman given her legitimate fear. 
CONCLUSION 
Currently, when a battered woman kills her abuser in the United States, she 
will generally either be found guilty of an intentional killing or acquitted on the 
basis of self-defense.  If a battered defendant advances a self-defense 
argument, the use of BWS evidence may place excessive blame on the 
deceased abuser and focus attention on the woman’s so-called psychological 
 
 277 See U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER AND INFANTICIDE: PROPOSALS FOR 
REFORM OF THE LAW, IMPACT ASSESSMENT 12 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/murder-
manslaughter-infanticide-impact-assessment.pdf (recognizing that when a battered woman kills, it can be 
based on fear, rather than anger or outrage). 
 278 See id. at 13 (discussing the need for a loss of self-control element to safeguard against reducing 
culpability for revenge or “honour” killings). 
 279 U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 225, at 43. 
 280 This reasonableness component would have the same effect as the reasonableness component found in 
current provocation law.  See Stephen James Odgers, Contemporary Provocation Law—Is Substantially 
Impaired Self-Control Enough?, in PARTIAL EXCUSES TO MURDER, supra note 122, at 101, 102–05 (discussing 
the “loss of self-control” and “ordinary person” requirements of provocation); see also Joshua Dressler, Why 
Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 973 (2002) 
(discussing the reasonableness component of current provocation law). 
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dysfunction.  This, in turn, may result in the woman being acquitted because of 
jury sympathy and a feeling that the batterer “got what he deserved,” rather 
than because of a finding, based on the law, that the killing was justified 
because there was no other alternative. 
While other common law countries, such as Australia, have expanded self-
defense laws and used BWS to accommodate battered women who kill their 
abusers in nonconfrontational situations, the ultimate outcome in these 
countries has been that battered women are portrayed as irrational and 
dysfunctional.  Furthermore, expanding self-defense laws calls into question 
the issue of what kind of killings should be justified or excused by the law.  If 
traditional standards of imminence and objective reasonableness are removed 
or distorted, more homicides might be carried out and those that are committed 
might not be properly punished. 
Under the law of provocation, countries like England have recognized that 
a woman may react to battering and abuse out of fear as well as anger, and the 
killing of her abuser can be seen as reasonable in this light.  However, the 
doctrine of provocation ensures that the woman still receives some 
punishment.  It is not necessary to pathologize battered women with 
syndromes and insist that they are passive and helpless.  In fact, such labels are 
hardly consistent with their actions, or the reality of women’s experiences in 
general.  By using provocation rather than self-defense law in cases where 
battered women preemptively kill their abusers, England has avoided the 
pitfalls presented by BWS while also recognizing that convicting such women 
of intentional, premeditated murder is not the best approach. England’s 
proposed reforms will make it that much easier for battered women defendants 
to successfully use provocation as a defense. 
The United States should use a reformed version of provocation law to 
accommodate battered women who kill their sleeping abusers, as this is the 
best compromise between two extremes and will more readily yield 
substantive justice for women who kill out of legitimate fear in a 
nonconfrontational circumstance.  A battered woman’s reactions can be 
compared to those of a reasonable, ordinary person in her shoes.  If such a 
comparison is successful her actions will be deemed objectively reasonable, 
yet she will still receive some punishment. 
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Provocation originated as a doctrine designed to protect men who killed 
their adulterous wives.281  As a result, provocation does not provide sufficient 
flexibility to address the circumstances of a battered woman who kills her 
husband.  It is necessary to reformulate the defense to extend the time between 
the provoking act and the defendant’s reaction, recognizing that fear can be as 
strong an emotion as anger.  Reformed provocation will not only reduce a 
battered defendant’s level of culpability,282 it will also better reflect a woman’s 
reality without “pathologizing” her.  Allowing a defense of reformed 
provocation will also better enable courts and society to see a battered woman 
who kills her sleeping abuser as a reasonable actor in light of the extraordinary 
danger of her situation. 
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 281 See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 
YALE L.J. 1331, 1341 (1997) (“Adultery was . . . the classic source of adequate provocation . . . .” (citations 
omitted)). 
 282 See supra Part IV.B. 
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